It is always to be remembered that above these motive principles and emotive attachments, we have the conscience, whose office it is to say when they should be gratified, and when they should he restrained, and also the will to decide between competing impulses or between inclination and duty.

We are to consider the emotions exclusively under one aspect, that is, as means of government. As viewing them in this light the common divisions or classifications will not suit our purpose, and so we are necessitated in the notice we take of them to form an arrangement of our own. These emotions, like the other instruments employed by God, physical and moral, contemplate two ends, one of incitement and encouragement, and another of restraint and arrest. The emotions may all be viewed under this double aspect. To every emotion of the one class, there is a corresponding emotion of the other class. Thus—

(1.) Some are INSTIGATIVE, and others ARRESTIVE; (2.) some are ADHESIVE, and others REPULSIVE; (3.) some are REMUNERATIVE, and others PUNITIVE; (4.) some are RESPONSIVE TO JOY, and others RESPONSIVE TO SORROW; (5.) some raise AESTHETIC ADMIRATION, others a SENSE OF REPUGNANCE.

I. There are the emotions which arise from the contemplation of possible or probable evil or good, they are THE ARRESTIVE AND INSTIGATIVE. The conception of evil, as about to come upon us, leads to apprehension, fear, dread, terror, according to the greatness or probability of the evil. This is in itself an agitating frame of mind, and so rouses the mind from lethargy; and, like all emotions, it quickens the train of thought clustering round the object, and thus suggests means of escape from the apprehended peril. The apprehension of good as about to be conferred, on the other hand, leads to hope and expectation; and the buoyancy of spirit produced prompts us to use the means required in order to procure the contemplated good, and

helps to prepare for its reception. To the same class are to be referred, as partaking of the nature both of the arrestive and instigative, those emotions of astonishment, surprise, and wonder which arise on the contemplation of new, unexpected, and strange phenomena, and in regard to which the mind is not aware, for a time, whether they may be for good or evil. The emotions now named tend to summon the attention, and to brace the mind to meet the emergency. We owe to the arrestive feelings much of